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Abstract
A common objection to the definition of intuitionistic implication
in the Proof Interpretation is that it is impredicative. I discuss the
history of that objection, argue that in Brouwer’s writings predica-
tivity of implication is ensured through parametric polymorphism of
functions on species, and compare this construal with the alterna-
tive approaches to predicative implication of Goodman, Dummett,
Prawitz, and Martin-Löf.
1 Impredicativity and intuitionistic implica-
tion
A definition is impredicative if it defines a member of a totality in terms
of that totality itself. There is a familiar contrast between two kinds of
impredicative definitions, as illustrated by these two examples:
1. k = the largest number in {1, 2, 3}; k is a member of that totality.
2. Let s be an infinite set. According to the power set axiom, there exists
a set P(s) = ιx(∀y(y ∈ x↔ y ⊆ s)). Here ∀y is a quantification over
the totality of all sets; P(s) is a member of that totality.
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In the first, the totality in question is enumerated and this is one way of
defining each of its elements prior to defining k; the impredicative definition
of k serves to single out a certain element of that totality, but is not essential
to the introduction of that element. On the other hand, for an infinite set s,
there is no alternative to characterising the set of all its subsets by relating
it to the totality of all sets, because there is no way to generate all subsets
of a given infinite set from below.1
For constructivists this means that the first definition is acceptable as
a definition of a mathematical object, whereas the second is not.2 More
generally, if at a given moment, the only definition available of a certain
object is an impredicative one that refers to a totality for which we at that
moment have no construction, then this definition cannot be used to guide
a construction process of that object. To construct the defined object, we
would first have to construct the totality that its definition refers to, but as
this totality contains the object we are in the process of constructing, we
find that we can only complete that process if we already have completed
it. In such cases the circularity of the impredicative definition is vicious.
Of Brouwerian intuitionism it has been argued that various of its defini-
tions are impredicative in the vicious sense, and hence not constructive: the
propositional connective of implication, the principle of induction, certain
sequences in the so-called Theory of the Creating Subject (Troelstra’s Para-
dox), the theory of ordinals, certain species in Brouwer. I will here focus on
the clause for implication in the Proof Interpretation; it will turn out that
this requires also a discussion of species, and sheds some light on the theory
of ordinals.3 An often cited formulation of it is that in Constructivism in
Mathematics by Troelstra and van Dalen:
A proof of A → B is a construction which permits us to trans-
form any proof of A into a proof of B. [Troelstra and van Dalen
1988, vol.1, p.9]
1That is, inductively. It is possible to define the species of subsets of a given infinite
set, but not to generate its extension; see p. 19 below on Brouwer’s acceptance of the
species of all species of real numbers. In his criticisms of Cantorian set theory in his
dissertation, Brouwer rejects arbitrary exponentiation, but does not go into the notion
of power set. See on this point van Dalen 1999, p.113. See also Poincaré 1909 (thanks to
Thierry Coquand for the suggestion).
2The Brouwer-Kripke Schema can be used to construct an intuitionistic analogue of
sorts to P(N) (van Dalen, 1977). For an analysis of that schema, see van Atten 2018.
3For a discussion of the principle of induction, see van Atten 2015a; for Troelstra’s
Paradox, van Atten 2017.
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In this formulation, one will want to understand ‘construction’ as a
function f , because then the explanation what a proof of an implication
is will have the definiteness, stability, and uniformity characteristic of a
function: for each argument there will be a determinate value, to a given
argument at any time the same value will be assigned, and to all arguments
a value is assigned in the same way.
How is the domain of such a function f to be understood?
It cannot be given by an inductive definition of all proofs of A, as there
can be no such definition. In particular, proofs of A may themselves contain
the implication A→ B, for example in this way:
(A→ B)→ A A→ B
→-E
A
Thus a prior explanation of A → B would be required, rendering the defi-
nition circular.
But if the domain is to be all proofs of A in an absolute sense that can not
be given by an inductive definition, then, so the claim goes, the definition
of such a function f will take a form that renders it impredicative:
f is a function such that, for any x in the totality of all intu-
itionistic proofs, if x is a proof of A, then f(x) is a proof of
B.
Any specific definition of this form will define an individual proof of A→ B
by referring to a totality to which it belongs, and thus be impredicative.
Intuitionists consider the notion of proof to be open-ended, not only epis-
temically (at no moment do we know all possible proofs) but ontologically,
and hence they deny that there is such a thing as the totality of all intuition-
istic proofs (Brouwer, 1907, pp.148-149). There is only a growing universe
of mathematical objects and proofs. For those who share the criticism that
intuitionistic implication is impredicative, this intuitionistic conception of
the universe would of course be part of what makes the whole enterprise
incoherent: Intuitionists cannot have both a universe that is growing and
a notion of implication that demands that it is a totality. Hence the intu-
itionistic denial that the universe is a totality only makes the question more
urgent whether there are understandings of the notions of proof, function,
and domain, such that they allow for an intuitionistically coherent reading
of the clause for implication in the Proof Interpretation.
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It might seem possible to circumvent the problem by defining A→ B to
mean ‘From the assumption that A is true, a proof of B can be obtained’,
the idea being that by making a mere assumption, talk of proofs is avoided
altogether.4 But on Brouwer’s notion of truth, according to which ‘truth
is only in reality i.e. in the present and past experiences of consciousness’
(Brouwer, 1949, p.1243), the fundamental meaning of ‘Proposition A is true’
is that a suitable mental construction that is correctly described by A has
been carried out. Brouwer allows the idealisation that, whenever the Subject
has not actually carried out a given construction method, but could do so
in principle, the construction it leads to may be counted among those that
have been carried out. But in each case an appeal to this must be made
explicitly, for otherwise there is no conceptual reduction to what has been
experienced. The latter remains the primary notion. Either way, there is no
such thing as a mere assumption. To assume that A is true is to assume that
a construction for A has been carried out (perhaps in an idealised sense).
A kind of ‘weak impredicativity’ may also be associated with the Proof
Interpretation. The term is taken from a draft note of 1970 by Gödel, not on
the Proof Interpretation, but on his computable functionals of finite type:
In particular, there exist functions of lower type which, within
T , can only be defined in terms of functions of higher types.
This is a kind of impredicativity. True, it is only one of those
weak impredicativities that are admitted even in Princ[ipia]
Math[ematica] 2nd ed. p.[XL],5 ff. In our proofs of the axioms
of T this impredicativity appears in the fact that the concept
of reductive proof may itself occur in reductive proofs (just as
in Heyting’s logic the general concept of proof may occur in a
proof). (van Atten, 2015b, p.218)
In the case of intuitionistic implication, this would pertain to the composi-
tion of the function f , which may depend on proofs of implications up to
a definite, but arbitrarily high, type, as a proof of a statement may refer
to proofs of more complex statements (Troelstra, 1990, p.233). To take a
simple example, f may be h◦g, with g raising the type and h appropriately
lowering it again. It may seem then as if the existence of functions of a lower
4This is done in ‘Basic Logic’, e.g., Ruitenburg 1993.
5[The typescript erroneously has ‘XI’, as had the original publication of Gödel’s Rus-
sell paper (Gödel, 1944, p.134).]
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type presupposes the existence of functions of higher types. I will return to
this problem after the discussion of strong impredicativity.
2 History of the objection
It has been claimed (Dean & Kurokawa, 2015, section 2) that the thought
that intuitionistic implication is impredicative goes back to Gödel’s lecture
titled ‘The present situation in the foundations of mathematics’, presented
at a meeting of the Mathematical Association of America in Cambridge,
Massachusetts on December 30, 1933 (Gödel, 1933b). Contrary to the or-
ganisers’ plan, Gödel left the text unpublished, but it was included in the
Collected Works in 1995. And the suggestion that the objection of impred-
icativity is made there seems natural; in that text Gödel questions the
constructive character of the intuitionistic explanation what a proof of a
negation consists in, which is a particular case of that for implication, and
his scepticism turns on the observation that this clause involves quantifica-
tion over all possible proofs. In this section, I will first argue that, all the
same, the objection that Gödel is actually making in 1933 is a different one,
and then conjecture that it was shortly after Yale lecture of 1941 that the
thought that intuitionistic implication is impredicative must have occurred
to him. I will then consider the question who was the first to make that
objection in print.
Gödel’s 1933 lecture is concerned with the question of a constructive
consistency proof for classical arithmetic. In considering what should count
as constructive mathematics, Gödel there argues against accepting impred-
icative definitions, and insists on inductive definitions. Gödel discusses the
prospects for a consistency proof for classical arithmetic using intuition-
istic logic, then best known from Heyting’s formalisation ‘Die formalen
Regeln der intuitionistischen Logik’ (Heyting, 1930a,b,c), as well as Heyt-
ing’s Königsberg lecture of 1930, ‘Die intuitionistische Grundlegung der Ma-
thematik’, published as Heyting 1931. When writing the text for his talk,
Gödel was able moreover to consult Heyting’s manuscript on intuitionism
meant for their joint book, eventually published by Heyting alone in Ma-
thematische Grundlagenforschung (Heyting, 1934). Heyting had sent the
manuscript of his part to Gödel in August 1932 (Gödel, 2003, p.54), more
than a year before Gödel’s talk.
In ‘Die formalen Regeln der intuitionistischen Logik’, Heyting says about
a ⊃ b that it means ‘If a is correct [‘richtig’], then so is b’ (Heyting, 1930a,
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p.5). In his Königsberg lecture of 1930, Heyting did not discuss implication
in general, but about the special case of negation he said: ‘The proposition
“C is not rational” means the expectation that from the assumption that
C is rational, a contradiction can be derived’ (Heyting, 1931, p.113). Gödel
knew that lecture well, because he had been in the audience, and in 1932
he reviewed the published version for the Zentralblatt (Gödel, 1932). But it
is in Mathematische Grundlagenforschung that one finds the first formula-
tion of the general clause for implication.6 On p.14, Heyting describes the
construction required to prove an implication a ⊃ b as one ‘which from
each proof of a leads to a proof of b’.7 This is a formulation that, unlike
the earlier ones, makes it explicit that this is an operation on proofs of a
and not a proof from the assumption a. I do not know whether Heyting’s
book of 1934 contained significant changes compared to the manuscript he
had sent Gödel in 1932. But if so, it will not have been on this particu-
lar point, as Heyting’s correspondence with fellow intuitionist Freudenthal
shows that Heyting had obtained the reading of implication as ‘I possess a
construction that derives from every proof of a a proof of b’ shortly after the
Königsberg lecture (Troelstra, 1983, pp.206–207). It is this understanding
that is assumed in Gödel’s criticism in the 1933 lecture.
The principles in Heyting’s formalisation that have Gödel’s special in-
terest are those for ‘absurdity’, that is, intuitionistic negation. But Gödel
goes on to argue that this notion is not constructive in his sense, and hence
of no use for a constructive consistency proof of classical arithmetic. The
problem he sees is that their intuitionistic explanation involve a reference
to the totality of all constructive proofs. The example he gives is
p ⊃ ¬¬p
which, he says, means ‘If p has been proved, then the assumption ¬p leads to
a contradiction’.8 Gödel says that these axioms are not about constructions
on a substrate of numbers but rather on a substrate of proofs, and therefore
the example may be explicated as ‘Given any proof for a proposition p, you
6In Brouwer’s work one finds various applications of it avant la lettre; see van Atten
2009, section 3.1.
7‘die aus jedem Beweis für a zu einem Beweis für b führt’.
8Gödel says this example shows ‘the character of the axioms assumed by Heyting’,
but in Heyting’s paper this one is not an axiom but a theorem (Heyting, 1930a, p.49, 4.3).
In a footnote, Heyting says that he had considered it an axiom, until Glivenko pointed
out to him that it was derivable.
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can construct a reductio ad absurdum for the proposition ¬p’. He then
comments that
Heyting’s axioms concerning absurdity and similar notions [. . . ]
violate the principle, which I stated before, that the word ‘any’
can be applied only to those totalities for which we have a finite
procedure for generating all their elements [. . . ] The totality of
all possible proofs certainly does not possess this character, and
nevertheless the word ‘any’ is applied to this totality in Heyt-
ing’s axioms [. . . ] Totalities whose elements cannot be generated
by a well-defined procedure are in some sense vague and indefi-
nite as to their borders. And this objection applies particularly
to the totality of intuitionistic proofs because of the vagueness of
the notion of constructivity. Therefore this foundation of classi-
cal arithmetic by means of the notion of absurdity is of doubtful
value. (Gödel, 1933b, p.53)
A draft of this passage in Gödel’s archive does not quite end with a rejection
of Heyting’s logic. Instead, it reflects:
Therefore you may be doubtfull [sic] as to the correctness of the
notion of absurdity and as to the value of a proof for freedom
from contradiction by means of this notion. But nevertheless it
may be granted that this foundation is at least more satisfactory
than the ordinary platonistic interpretation [. . . ]9
Either way, the doubt about, or objection to, the notion of absurdity im-
mediately generalises to implication as such.
It is remarkable, given the construction of Gödel’s talk, in which the dis-
cussion of the intuitionistic logical connectives is preceded by an argument
against the use impredicative definitions for foundational purposes, that
the objection Gödel puts forward is not that Heyting’s principles for absur-
dity are impredicative, but that they are vague. Impredicativity of course
entails constructive undefinability and in that sense vagueness, and it is
possible that Gödel had seen the problem of impredicativity but thought
that, in the context of a consistency proof that is looked for because of its
9Gödel no date, Series IV, box 7b, folder 26, document #040113, page 22. Work
of Kurt Gödel used with permission. Unpublished Copyright (1934-1978) Institute for
Advanced Study. All rights reserved by Institute for Advanced Study.
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epistemic interest, vagueness is the more important thing to note, even if
impredicativity is the cause of it.
But vagueness may arise on other grounds, and indeed to me it seems
that the vagueness Gödel finds problematic in 1933 is not that caused by
impredicativity, but by open-endedness. After all, when Gödel writes that
For the totality of all possible proofs certainly does not possess
this character [of being an infinity that is generated by a finite
procedure], and nevertheless the word ‘any’ is applied to this
totality in Heyting’s axioms
the second clause is evidently not presented as an explanation of the first.
But if one’s objection were that of impredicativity, one would do just that.
One would argue that to accept the application of the word ‘any’ to the
totality of all possible proofs, an application that occurs in Heyting’s expla-
nation of what a proof of a negation consists in, is to accept the existence
of a proof that is impredicatively defined, and therefore of a proof that will
never be generated by a finite procedure; and that, by implication, the total-
ity of all possible proofs does not possess the character of being an infinity
that is generated by a finite procedure, and hence is not constructive in the
sense Gödel requires. But this is not an argument one finds in his lecture.
In fact, while Gödel does point out the problem, from a constructive point
of view, with impredicatively defined integers, he does not say anything at
all about impredicatively defined proofs. The first incompleteness theorem,
on the other hand, was brought up earlier in the lecture, and explained
as meaning that no single consistent formal system can embrace all for-
mal proofs. There is, then, no finite generating procedure to exhaust all
possible proofs. And that the term ‘any’ as it figures in Heyting’s axioms
indeed must be taken to apply to the totality of all possible proofs, and
cannot be explained via the notion of provability in any single formal sys-
tem, was a result, based on the second incompleteness theorem, that Gödel
had contributed to Menger’s seminar in 1931/1932,10 well before writing
his Cambridge lecture.11
Also in his subsequent discussions in the ‘Lecture at Zilsel’s’ of 1938
10It was published in Gödel 1933a.
11When Gödel in the lecture goes on to say that ‘this objection applies particularly to
the totality of intuitionistic proofs because of the vagueness of the notion of constructivity’
(Gödel, 1933b, p.53), he is pointing to a reinforcement of the problem, not the problem
as he sees it come about.
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and the lecture at Yale ‘In what sense is intuitionistic logic constructive?’
of 1941, Gödel emphasises that intuitionistic provability cannot mean prov-
ability in a particular formal system, and is therefore not constructive in
what he there takes to be the strictest sense, but he does not thematise im-
predicativity of any logical operation (Gödel 1938, pp.100-102; Gödel 1941,
p.190).
As long as Gödel held on to the ‘concrete’ notion of constructivity out-
lined in each of the lectures of 1933, 1938, and 1941, a notion founded on the
idea of finite generating procedures, his argument that intuitionistic logic is
vague on account of the incompleteness theorem must have convinced him
that it is of no epistemic value in consistency proofs. But it no longer could
when, in the year after the Yale lecture, Gödel came to accept, like the
intuitionists, abstract notions as part of his concept of constructivity; the
suggestion occurs already in his Princeton lectures on intuitionism, which
ended on May 1, whereas the Yale lecture had been delivered on April 15
(van Atten, 2015b, section 11.3.5.2). In Gödel’s case, the abstract notion
accepted as constructive was not the intuitionistic notion of proof, but that
of computable functional of finite type, which he showed can replace the
former when limited to its application in arithmetic. (Gödel describes the
necessity of admitting abstract notion in print only in his Dialectica paper
of 1958; in the introduction of that paper Gödel is, in effect, also address-
ing his former self.) On the other hand, Gödel continued to hold, unlike
the intuitionists, that there exists a totality of all proofs.12 But while the
predicativity of his old notion of constructivity was ensured by its defini-
tion, this was not so for the widened one. This became (and remained) a
matter of great concern to Gödel. If the thought that implication in Heyt-
ing’s Proof Interpretation might be impredicative had not occurred to him
before, it will have then.
Not much time later, between November 1942 and May 1943, Gödel
wrote his paper ‘Russell’s mathematical logic’, published in 1944. There,
Gödel comes to speak of the ‘self-reflexivity’ of impredicatively defined
properties (Gödel, 1944, p.139)13 and points out that this self-reflexivity
12In the 1972 version of the Dialectica paper, Gödel introduced the notion of ‘reductive
proof’, by which he hoped to arrive at an interpretation of intuitionistic logic that ‘in
no way presupposes Heyting’s and that, moreover, it is constructive and evident in a
higher degree than Heyting’s. For it is exactly the elimination of such vast generalities
as “any proof” which makes for greater evidence and constructivity’ (Gödel, 1972, p.276n,
emphasis mine); see also van Atten 2015b, sections 11.3.5.7 and 11.3.5.9.
13Russell, in his paper ‘On some difficulties in the theory of transfinite numbers and
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need not be problematic in general, but, when it occurs in definitions that
are meant to be constructive, renders them viciously circular. However, he
does not add that, specifically, the property of being an intuitionistic proof
of an implication is problematic.
The first manuscript of Gödel’s in which it is stated that intuitionis-
tic logic is impredicative is an intermediate version of around 1970 of the
revised Dialectica paper, and it is also included in the last, 1972 version,
posthumously published in Collected Works.14 By then, it had of course
been stated in print elsewhere.
Although Gödel, in print, remained silent on the question, his use of
the term ‘self-reflexivity’ in relation to impredicativity in the Russell paper
seems to have struck a chord. When Heyting published his book Intuition-
ism. An Introduction (1956), probably the most influential publication on
intuitionism ever, it was immediately reviewed by Sigekatu Kuroda, in the
Journal of Symbolic Logic. That review may well be the first publication of,
in effect, the objection that intuitionistic implication is impredicative:
The proof of the fan theorem in this book is strikingly brief,
although it is essentially the same as Brouwer’s original proof of
1926 (Mathematische Annalen vol.97, p. 66, Th. 2).15 By means
of the dialogue method the author discusses a certain peculiar-
ity of the proof of the fan theorem, namely that it depends on
inferences, i.e., constructions, which are assumed to have been
executed previously. The comment of the author (or a person
in the dialogue) about it is as follows: ‘If we are well aware that
the hypothesis of a theorem consists always in the assumption
of a previous execution of some construction, we can offer no ob-
jection against the use of considerations about the way in which
such a construction can be performed as a means of proof.’ The
reviewer fully agrees to this comment. However, the assumed
construction may contain a construction by the application of
other fan theorems, in which further previous constructions are
assumed, and so on. In this way the assumption of a fan theorem
order types’ (1906), which Gödel refers to in his own paper, had used the simpler term
‘reflexive’.
14Gödel Papers, 9b/144, item 040454, pages 13, end of note (j), 9b/144, item 040456,
pages 6, end of note (j), and item 040459, pages 6, end of note (j); and Gödel 1990, p.274
note f.
15[Brouwer 1927b]
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may contain, so to speak, in a nested manner many other fan
theorems. The same situation arises when we wish to clarify the
intuitionistic concept of negation (cf. 7.1.1), and of implication,
as well as that of a function. The self-reflexive character of these
could never be completely clarified by any formal method. [. . . ]
Nevertheless, some clear analysis of the proof of the fan theo-
rem would be necessary, because no proof may be self-reflexive.
(Kuroda, 1956, p.369)
It is not wholly clear to me to what extent Kuroda takes an intuitionis-
tic implication to be different from a theorem based on a hypothesis; on
Brouwer’s conception of truth, however, they are the same, as to assume
that P is to assume that P has been demonstrated. The identification of
assuming the antecedent of an implication and assuming that a prior con-
struction has been effected is also clearly shown by Heyting’s clause for
implication in the book under review:
The implication p → q can be asserted, if and only if we pos-
sess a construction r, which, joined to any construction proving
p (supposing that the latter be effected), would automatically
effect a construction proving q. (Heyting, 1956, p.98)
Perhaps the reason why Heyting in chapter 3 does not present the fan the-
orem in logical notation was that he was there focused on its mathematical
content, whereas logic is discussed only in the penultimate chapter of his
book; the same remark can in fact be made about all theorems outside the
chapter on logic.
Be that as it may, Kuroda signals the same problem for both. Although
he does not invoke impredicativity here, it clearly is the problem he is
describing, using instead the same term that Gödel had associated with
impredicative definitions and its problem for constructivists in his Russell
paper, ‘self-reflexivity’.
Kuroda’s review came out in 1956, after he had passed the academic year
1955-1956 at the Institute for Advanced Study, where he had had discussions
with Gödel and also with Kreisel (Kuroda, 1958, p.248).16 Kuroda had
published four paper intuitionistic logic and its philosophical aspects before
16‘The author has begun this work while at the Institute for Advanced Study in Prince-
ton, to which the author would like to express his gratitude for its giving him an opportu-
nity to ponder on the foundations of mathematics, specifically to Professors Kurt Gödel
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(1947; 1948; 1949; 1951). One readily imagines therefore that the question of
the meaning of intuitionistic logic was among the topics of his conversations
with Gödel and Kreisel; however, that has so far not been documented.
Indeed, it is Kreisel who soon after Kuroda’s review does use the term
‘impredicative’ to characterise the intuitionistic notion of proof, in his 1958
review of Wittgenstein’s Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics:
[Intuitionism] goes beyond finitism because it makes statements
concerning all possible constructions, which certainly do not
constitute a concrete totality. [. . . ] undecided propositions, and
even implications between such propositions, may be used as pre-
misses in implications, i.e. one makes assertions which involve an
hypothetical proof, namely a proof of the premise, though the to-
tality of all proofs is not concretely specified [. . . ] Finitist mathe-
matics does not use the general notion of a constructive proof at
all, in fact it might be said to avoid logical inferences (which in-
volve an impredicative concept of proof ) because it is restricted
to purely combinatorial operations. (Kreisel, 1958, pp.147-148;
emphasis mine)
Later Kreisel added a twist: in ‘Mathematical logic’ (Kreisel, 1965) he
accepts a certain theory as constructive, even though on the interpretation
he proposes it is not predicative, on the ground that the Proof Interpretation
is not predicative either:
We give here a formulation for intuitionistic logic which is proof
theoretically equivalent to R [Feferman’s 1964 system of predica-
tive analysis]. [. . . ] [N]ote that, for the interpretation of Section
2 [i.e., the Proof Interpretation], this theory does not have pred-
icative character at all, because the intuitionistic logical opera-
tors are themselves defined self-reflexively. (Kreisel, 1965, p.176,
3.531)
(Note the use of ‘self-reflexive’.) Myhill in ‘The formalization of intuitionism’
of 1968 comments that it is an ingenious ad-hominem argument (p.337), and
indeed it is not an argument that settles the matter.
and Georg Kreisel for many strict criticisms and valuable discussions on this work at
that time.’ (Leopoldt, 1975, p.2)
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3 Brouwerian implication is predicative and
parametrically polymorphic
Myhill goes on to say that ‘Brouwer’s own practice leaves the issue [of pred-
icative vs impredicative intuitionism] quite undecided’. That impression is
based on cases in which Brouwer seems to countenance certain impredica-
tive definitions, of which we will see examples below. But I will argue that
this is only seemingly so, and that Brouwer did not accept impredicative
definitions. In particular, he had notions of proof, function, and domain
that allow for an understanding of implication that is predicative. Readers
familiar with the literature on Martin-Löf’s Constructive Type Theory will
see a similarity of the account presented in this section with the conception
of type theory as a predicative open-ended system with an infinite series of
expanding universes; in particular, with Michael Rathjen’s point ‘that all
functions that deserve to be called effective must at least be definable in a
way that is persistent with expansions of the universe of types’ (Rathjen,
2009, p.427). My aim here is not to analyse such similarities but to present,
for its own sake, the older Brouwerian wherewithal that happens to bring
this similarity about.
Brouwer held that mathematics consists first of all in mental acts of
construction (Brouwer, 1907), and Heyting explained the relation between
such constructions and proofs as follows:
If mathematics consists of mental constructions, then every
mathematical theorem is the expression of a result of a suc-
cessful construction. The proof of the theorem consists in this
construction itself, and the steps of the proof are the same as the
steps of the mathematical construction. (Heyting, 1958, p.107)
After certain acts of mental construction have been carried out, these may
in reflection, be objectified. For Brouwer this is one form (the nonlinguistic
one) of ‘second-order mathematics’: the mathematical viewing of mathemat-
ical acts (Brouwer, 1907, pp.98,119n,173). There is, then, a primary sense
of proof as process, and a secondary one of proof as objectified process, and
the object constructed in the process is the whole of the constructed objects
and relations between them that make the proved proposition true; a state
of affairs.
In order to keep proofs in Brouwer’s sense, that is proofs in the sense
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of episodes in the mental life of the Creating Subject, terminologically
distinct from proofs in the sense of linguistic or abstract objects out-
side the mind, we may propose to call Brouwer’s proofs demonstrations
(Sundholm & van Atten, 2008); the ambiguity between demonstration as
act and demonstration as object is accepted and dealt with by adding the
appropriate qualification.
The most memorable example of Brouwer’s use of demonstration objects
is in his paper ‘Über Definitionsbereiche von Funktionen’ (Brouwer, 1927b),
in which he gives a demonstration of the Bar Theorem and in footnote 8
adds this elucidation:
Just as, in general, well-ordered species are produced by means
of the two generating operations from primitive species (see my
paper [Brouwer 1927a, p. 451]), so, in particular, mathemati-
cal demonstrations [‘Beweisführungen’] are produced by means
of the two generating operations from null elements and ele-
mentary inferences [‘Elementarschlüssen’] that are immediately
given in intuition (albeit subject to the restriction that there
always occurs a last elementary inference). These mental math-
ematical proofs [‘gedanklichen Beweisführungen’] that in general
contain infinitely many parts [‘Glieder’] must not be confused
with their linguistic accompaniments, which are finite and nec-
essarily inadequate, hence do not belong to mathematics.
The preceding remark contains my main argument against
the claims of Hilbert’s metamathematics. (Brouwer, 1927b,
p.64n8)
Brouwer says here that a Beweisführung is a species, one of Brouwer’s
two constructive analogues to a classical set,17 and a well-ordered one at
that. What will be of particular interest for the present purpose is not that
individual demonstrations are species, but that, being mathematical objects,
demonstrations may be collected in a second-order species. Brouwer defined
species as
properties supposable for mathematical entities previously ac-
quired, and satisfying the condition that, if they hold for a cer-
tain mathematical entity, they also hold for all mathematical
17The other one is the spread, which in fact is a special case.
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entities which have been defined to be equal to it, relations of
equality having to be symmetric, reflexive and transitive; mathe-
matical entities previously acquired for which the property holds
are called the elements of the species. (Brouwer, 1952, p.142)
Here, an object qualifies as ‘previously acquired’ if either it has actually
been constructed, or a method has been indicated for constructing it.18
Higher-order species were present from the beginning: A species of order n
has as elements mathematical entities or species of order n − 1 (Brouwer,
1918, p.4).
An example of objects that count as all acquired even though there
are infinitely many of them is of course the natural numbers, given that
for them we possess a construction method. Under this definition, then,
the existence of an object precedes the existence of any species that it may
become an element of, and this rules out essentially impredicative definitions
of elements of a species. Curiously, given his early interest in Poincaré and
18 This explicit condition was absent from the first definition of species (1918):
Unter einer Species erster Ordnung verstehen wir eine Eigenschaft, welche
nur eine mathematische Entität besitzen kann, in welchem Falle sie ein
Element der Species erster Ordnung genannt wird. (Brouwer, 1918, pp.3-4)
It does not occur in the similar definition of 1925 either:
Unter einer Spezies erster Ordnung verstehen wir eine (begrifflich fertig
definierte) Eigenschaft, welche nur eine mathematische Entität besitzen
kann, in welchem Falle sie ein Element der Species erster Ordnung genannt
wird. (Brouwer, 1925, p.245)
It seems to make its first appearance in handwritten additions to a manuscript related
to the Berlin lectures, which where held in 1927:
[. . . ] moreover the admission at each stage of this construction of mathe-
matics of properties which can be presupposed for mathematical previously
acquired mathematical thought-entities, as new mathematical thought-
entities under the name of species (van Stigt, 1990, pp.483-484, trl. mod-
ified) [‘. . . en daarbij de toelating, in ieder stadium van dezen opbouw
der wiskunde, van eigenschappen, die voor reedsch verkregen mathemati-
sche denkbaarheden ondersteld kunnen worden, als nieuwe mathematische
denkbaarheden onder den naam van soorten.’ (van Stigt, 1990, p.482)]
At the time, Brouwer had the project of publishing the Berlin lectures as a book
(van Dalen, 2005, p.551), but this addition may have been made at any time; it was
incorporated almost verbatim in Brouwer 1947, p.23.
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Russell, Brouwer never pauses to state this; Heyting later does (Heyting
1931, p.111, Heyting 1934, p.25).19 As we will see, Brouwer does make the
remark that species, thus defined, cannot be elements of themselves.
But the definition of a species is well-motivated independently of its
constructively welcome consequence that the definition of an element of
a species is always predicative. This independent motivation can be seen
by considering that the existence of a species S amounts to the existence
of an assignment, to each existing object a, of the hypothesis that it has
the property P . As Brouwer says, a species is a ‘property supposable for
mathematical entities previously acquired’ (emphasis mine). To accentuate
the role of hypotheses in Brouwer’s species is one of the virtues of Van Stigt’s
discussion of that notion (van Stigt, 1990, section 6.3.6); I should like to
add that this assignment is a function. Its domain is every existing object
(all objects ‘previously acquired’) because for each of them the proposition
that it has that property is meaningful (whether that proposition turns out
to be true, false, or undecided).
What the domain of the function can not include is objects beyond those
that have been previously acquired, as otherwise to construct the domain we
should be able to effect a construction out of non-acquired objects, which
is impossible;20 and the associated hypotheses would not be meaningful.
It would seem, then, that while this conception obviously allows for the
existence of the species of the natural numbers, there could be no such
thing as, for example, the species of real numbers. There are more than
finitely many of them, but no construction method for generating all, and
hence at no point they will all have been acquired. But Brouwer adds the
following comment:
With regard to this definition of species we have to remark
firstly that, during the development of intuitionistic mathemat-
ics, some species will have to be considered as being re-defined
time and again in the same way, secondly that a species can very
well be an element of another species, but never an element of
itself. (Brouwer, 1952, p.142)
With every further acquisition of objects, the function implicit in the def-
19These passages confirm Beeson’s supposition (Beeson, 1985, p.52) that Heyting’s
intention was to insist that species be defined predicatively.
20This means also that the function cannot be a member of its own domain; see the
postscript to van Atten 2017.
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inition of a species that generates the hypotheses P (a) should be defined
anew, because this acquisition means that we want to extend the domain of
that function; and the definition of the domain is a constitutive part of the
definition of a function.21 But the way in which the new objects belong to
the species should be the same as that for the objects it already contains.
In the case of the species of real numbers, each object that belongs to it
does so because it has the property of being a convergent choice sequence
of rational intervals. This warrants speaking of the redefined species being
the same species as the previous one: it is a growing object.
This redefinition of species along the different stages of the Creating Sub-
ject’s activity is of course analogous to the situation in the later developed
and more familiar Kripke models, where a predicate may be valuated dif-
ferently along a path through possible worlds (‘evidential situations’), with
later valuations including the earlier ones. By this I do not mean to make
the farther-reaching suggestion that Kripke models explain the intended
meaning of intuitionistic logic.22 It is rather a stepping stone towards the
idea that, to make the notion of a species such as Brouwer uses it fully ex-
plicit, one may associate to it an infinite sequence that starts with a species
in the strict sense (i.e., with a fixed domain), and in which every further
species is obtained in a separate defining act of the Creating Subject, as an
extension of the previous one.
A special case of growing species are those for which we have a a method
to generate denumerably many elements of it, but also a method to extend
any species thereby obtained. This is very close to Russell’s notion of ‘self-
reproductive processes and classes’.
21So the need of redefinition in the case of certain species was implicit in the definition
of species as soon as it started to include the qualification ‘previously acquired entities’;
see footnote 18.
22Indeed it was not designed to meet that desideratum:
I do not think of ‘possible worlds’ as providing a reductive analysis in
any philosophically significant sense, that is, as uncovering the ultimate
nature, from either an epistemological or a metaphysical point of view,
of modal operators, propositions, etc., or as ‘explicating them’. [. . . ] The
main and the original motivation for the ‘possible worlds analysis’ – and
the way it clarified modal logic – was that it enabled modal logic to be
treated by the same set theoretic techniques of model theory that proved
so successful when applied to extensional logic. It is also useful in making
certain concepts clear. (Kripke, 1980, p.19n18)
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[A]ccording to current logical assumptions, there are what we
may call self-reproductive processes and classes. That is, there
are some properties such that, given any class of terms all having
such a property, we can always define a new term also having the
property in question. Hence we can never collect all the terms
having the said property into a whole [. . . ] (Russell, 1906, p.36)
This is from Russell’s paper ‘On some difficulties in the theory of transfinite
numbers and order types’ of 1906. Brouwer’s notebooks towards his disser-
tation, and that dissertation itself, defended in February 1907, contain no
indication that he was aware of Russell’s paper. Be that as it may, the ‘de-
numerably unfinished sets’ that he introduces in the dissertation are very
similar:
[H]ere we call a set denumerably unfinished if it has the following
properties: we can never construct in a well-defined way more
than a denumerable subset of it, but when we have constructed
such a subset, we can immediately deduce from it, following
some previously defined mathematical process, new elements
which are counted to the original set. But from a strictly math-
ematical point of view this set does not exist as a whole, nor
does its power exist; however we can introduce these words here
as an expression for a known intention.23 (Brouwer 1907, p.148,
trl. Brouwer 1975, p.82)
Brouwer’s definition is motivated by a preceding discussion why Cantor’s
second number class is not, as a whole, a constructible entity; it is a de-
numerably unfinished set. Following this definition are the examples of the
totality of definable points on the continuum and a fortiori the totality of
all possible mathematical systems. Brouwer’s notebooks towards his disser-
tation show that he made his first remark on denumerably unfinished sets
early on (probably 1905), while reading chapter 55, on projective geometry,
in Russell’s Principles of Mathematics (1903):
One will never be able to resolve the whole mystery of space and
surfaces in such a way, that there is no hocus-pocus to it any-
more; for the number of possible buildings [i.e., constructions]
23[‘Intention’ translates the Dutch ‘bedoeling’.]
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is denumerably unfinished, hence not surveyable. (Brouwer,
no date, Notebooks 1904–1907, vol.II, p.32)24
Later, Dummett would discuss collections of that type, with reference to
Russell but not to Brouwer, as ‘indefinitely extensible concepts’.25 It has
been noticed that the concept of a denumerably unfinished set more or
less disappears from Brouwer’s writings after the introduction of choice se-
quences (van Dalen, 1999, p.115); with the new concept of redefined species,
Brouwer could moreover subsume that of denumerably unfinished set under
the latter.
Illustrative in this respect is Brouwer’s assertion, in a paper of 1927, of
the existence of ‘the species O of ordinal numbers’ (Brouwer, 1927a, p.487).
Firstly, because strictly speaking there is no such thing as the species of
ordinal numbers; whenever we have defined an enumeration of ordinals, this
can be used to construct a new ordinal. But it is the implicit redefinitions
of the species that allow Brouwer to speak this way.26 Secondly, because he
is not calling O a denumerably unfinished set here. Earlier, in a published
reply to Mannoury’s review of his dissertation, Brouwer had called the set
of definable points on the continuum denumerably unfinished; and although
that is not the same set, Brouwer here is otherwise repeating his reply to
Mannoury.27
Similarly, in the Cambridge Lectures of 1946–1951 he can accept the
species of all species of real numbers (Brouwer, 1981, p.26n),28 and he could,
a fortiori, have accepted the species of all species of natural numbers.29
24‘Men zou het heele mysterie van ruimte en vlakken nooit kunnen ophelderen zóó,
dat er geen hokuspokus meer aan is; immers het aantal mogelijke gebouwen is aftelbaar
onaf, dus niet te overzien.’
25First in ‘The philosophical significance of Gödel’s Theorem’ (Dummett, 1963), with-
out reference to Russell. For a more elaborate discussion, with the reference, see Dummett
1991a, pp.316–319. Various connections can be made also to the discussion of such con-
cepts by Wright and Shapiro (2006) in their ‘All things indefinitely extensible’.
26Thus, I do not share the view expressed in Gielen et al. 1981, p.127 that Brouwer’s
accepting this species O is an indication that over the years he had become ‘more liberal’.
27See Mannoury 1908 and Brouwer 1908 (pp.162 and 170 of the reprints in van Dalen
2001), and, for further discussion of ‘denumerably unfinished sets’, Kuiper 2004, section
7.6.2.
28In contrast, its editor, Dirk van Dalen, in a footnote (Brouwer, 1981, p.26n18) com-
ments that ‘Brouwer literally quotes the power set of the reals’. (He continues by pointing
out that Brouwer does not actually need the power set for the example he gives on that
page.)
29Heyting (1962, p.195) considered it ‘doubtful’ that these formed a species, and pre-
ferred not to use the notion.
19
Implicit redefinition of a species is also essential to considerations
whether some hypothetical object would belong to a certain species: This is
possible because, on Brouwer’s conception of existence, to reason about a
hypothetical object is to reason under the hypothesis that that object has
been acquired, and hence that the species has been redefined accordingly.
And just as in the case of the species, the function that is implicit
in its definition may have to be redefined time and again, so will every
function defined on such a species. The reason is again that the change in
the species which is the domain of the function necessitates a redefinition
of the function, even though the way the new function acts on the elements
of its domain is the same as for the old function. These redefinitions of
a function on a species can be made explicit as an infinite sequence of
functions parallel to the infinite sequence of species.
The one thing that needs to be verified is that from the mere schemata
of the species and the function defined on it a sufficient justification can
be found for the constructibility of such functions on arbitrary elements
of the species. In the case of demonstration, the most obvious and most
frequently used property is that a demonstration of A has conclusion A.
If that is all the information that the function will use, then it will indeed
work for arbitrary demonstrations of A. But in the case of the Bar Theorem,
Brouwer considered that for A = ‘There is a (decidable) bar in the tree’
a further structural property is known, namely that every demonstration
object of A can be put into a specific canonical form.
In Brouwer’s view, as we saw, demonstration objects of propositions
are themselves objects of mathematics and hence may become elements
of species. The species of demonstration objects of A is not an example
Brouwer gives explicitly. But when we understand implication as
There exists a function f that transforms any element of the
species of demonstration objects of A into an element of the
species of demonstration objects of B
our understanding should reflect the fact that both this function and the
species that is its domain (and, perhaps, the species that is its range) are
growing objects. As constructions, these take the form of infinite sequences.
Hence, that formulation is to be taken as shorthand for
There exists an infinite sequence of species of demonstration
objects of A indexed by their stage of definition m, and an infi-
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nite sequence of functions fm, each extended by the next, such
that fm transforms any element of the species of demonstra-
tion objects of A at stage m into an element of the species of
demonstration objects of B at stage m.
f : A→ B =
A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ A3 · · · Am · · ·



y
f1




y
f2




y
f3




y
fm
B1 ⊆ B2 ⊆ B3 · · · Bm · · ·
By thus taking ‘the species of all demonstration objects’, and hence
any subspecies ‘demonstration objects of A’ to be a façon de parler for an
infinite sequence of ever larger species, and a function on such a species
to be a façon de parler for an infinite sequence of functions that all have
been, or will be, defined according to the same schema, an understanding
of implication becomes possible that does not require quantification over
the totality of demonstration objects.30
From the perspective of modern type theory, and the theory of pro-
gramming languages, one would not call it a façon de parler, but rather an
implementation, namely, of parametric polymorphism.31 A function is para-
metrically polymorphic if its arguments need not each be of one fixed type,
but may come from a family of types, on which the function however acts
uniformly;32 the types of the arguments are considered to be parameters,
and with different instantiations of these parameters the function takes a
different shape. A standard example is a function that takes finite sequences
of elements of arbitrary type and returns the length of the sequence. In the
case of Brouwerian implication, as reconstructed here, a function f that
proves an implication A → B is likewise parametrically polymorphic. The
30Independently, a formal semantics showing a structurally similar approach to intu-
itionistic implication has simultaneously been developed in Tabatabai 2017.
31The notion was introduced in a lecture course by Christopher Strachey in 1967, pub-
lished as Strachey 2000. See also Cardelli & Wegner 1985. Simultaneously with the first
preprint of the present paper, the preprint Pistone 2017 appeared, which draws attention
to the epistemological significance of parametricity for the study of impredicativity, there
in the context of consistency arguments for impredicative systems.
32In intuitionistic mathematics, that should not mean that the function cannot inspect
its arguments at all; in the Bar Theorem, where non-canonical proofs of the antecedent
are to be transformed into canonical form, on which then a proof of the consequent is
based, it is even essential that one can. What cannot be done is to treat, upon inspection,
different arguments instantiating the same polymorphic type differently.
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family of argument types it can act on consists of the species of demonstra-
tion objects of A at stage m, for all m; the function f has, so to speak,
infinitely many types at once. Depending on A, the arguments of the func-
tion f may themselves be polymorphic functions (iteration of implication),
but all polymorphic functions used here are bounded in that their domains
are limited to demonstration objects that have been ‘previously acquired’.
This induces a stratification. In particular, then, none of these polymorphic
functions can be an element of its own domain. The form of parametric poly-
morphism described here is more expressive than unstratified predicative
polymorphism (where polymorphic type variables are always instantiated
with non-polymorphic types), and less expressive than impredicative poly-
morphism (where polymorphic type variables may be instantiated with any
type).33 This is known as ‘finitely stratified polymorphism’ (Leivant, 1991);
the finiteness comes naturally in Brouwerian intuitionism, where mathemat-
ical construction acts are taken to proceed in an ω-order, so that any stage
of the Creating Subject’s activity has only finitely many predecessors, and
hence by stage n there exist only the finitely many species of demonstration
objects of A at stage m < n.
From this point of view, the upshot of the present account, then, is
that not only is intuitionistic logic an appropriate logic to reason about
parametricity,34 but, on a Brouwerian conception of logic at least, it does
itself arise from parametricity. There is no circularity because for Brouwer
logic depends on mathematics, not the other way around, and parametricity
is a mathematical phenomenon.35
Heyting’s formalisation of species in 1930, which predates the discussion
of impredicativity in the Proof Interpretation, is set up in a way that, in
hindsight, has the effect of specifically blocking parametric polymorphism:
With this notation it is not possible to extend the domain of a
mapping without changing the name of the mapping. If one has
defined e.g. the function sin on the domain of the real numbers,
and wishes to extend it to the domain of the complex numbers,
33It would be interesting to know more, historically, about Brouwer’s knowledge of
Russell’s ramified theory of types.
34For an overview, see Meseguer 1989. Of particular interest is also McCarty 1991,
which relates polymorphism to Brouwer’s notion of apartness.
35Conversely, the notion of parametricity is broadly applicable in mathematics.
See Hermida et al. 2014.
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one from now on needs to refer to that which so far was called
sin by sin ↾ (real numbers) (Heyting, 1930b, p.12, trl. mine).36
And Heyting in 1956 defines species in such a way that the need to
redefine them, together with functions defined on them, is lost sight of, or
rather, is suggested not to exist:
Definition 1. A species is a property which mathematical entities
can be supposed to possess (L. E. J. Brouwer 1918, p. 4; 1924,
p. 245; 1952, p. 142).
Definition 2. After a species S has been defined, any mathe-
matical entity which has been or might have been defined before
S and which satisfies the condition S, is a member of the species
S. (Heyting, 1956, section 3.2.1, emphasis mine)
This is of importance for a historical understanding of the discussion of
impredicativity in intuitionism, because at least until the publication of
Brouwer 1975, Heyting’s book was a, if not the, major reference in the
discussion.
The present analysis of Brouwer’s species and functions on them also
allows for the weak impredicativity that Gödel indicated (see above, p. 4).
Gödel was referring to the fact that the definition of a computable functional
from a low type to another low type may refer to functionals of arbitrarily
higher types; for an implication this corresponds to the idea that a proof
of it may contain proofs of statements that are arbitrarily more complex
than the antecedent or the consequent. In his Russell paper, Gödel had
argued that, if one accepts Russell and Whitehead’s axiom that functions
occur in propositions only extensionally (introduced in the second edition of
Principia, pages xl-xli), then definitions of functions exhibiting this kind of
impredicativity ‘are quite unobjectionable even from the constructive stand-
point [. . . ] provided that quantifiers are always restricted to definite orders’
(Gödel, 1944, p.134). On the other hand, intuitionistically that axiom would
be unnatural. A construction that depends on a function f , such as a con-
struction that is a truth-maker of a proposition referring to f , should be
36‘Bei dieser Schreibweise ist es nicht möglich, das Gebiet einer Abbildung zu erweitern,
ohne die Benennung der Abbildung zu ändern. Wenn man z.B. die Funktion sin für das
Gebiet der reellen Zahlen definiert hat, und man will sie auf das Gebiet der komplexen
Zahlen erweitern, so ist man genötigt, dasjenige, das bisher sin hieß, weiterhin durch
sin ↾ (reellen Zahlen) anzudeuten.’
allowed to depend on how f is given to us. It is, however, possible to define
a function at a higher type before certain functions at a lower type that are
defined so as to depend on the former, as long as the higher-type function
is appropriately generic; that is, as long as it is guaranteed that the higher-
type function will also work as expected on arguments that are constructed
after it.
4 Comparison with other predicative accounts
of implication
Other constructive accounts of implication that, like Brouwer’s, employ the
strategy of stratification to give an account of implication that does not
quantify over a totality of all possible proofs, are the ‘theory of construc-
tions’ of Kreisel (1962; 1965) and Goodman (1970; 1973a; 1973b)37 and the
meaning-theoretical approaches of Dummett (1975), Martin-Löf (1975), and
Prawitz (1977). As these are well known, the question arises to what extent
their different ways of implementing that general strategy may suggest alter-
natives for a Brouwerian intuitionist to adapt and adopt. I will look at the
theory of constructions in Goodman’s version as it was specifically adapted
from Kreisel’s to avoid impredicativity. The idea of canonical proofs will be
discussed in quite general terms because, for all the differences that exist
between the exact ways in which Dummett, Prawitz, and Martin-Löf have
developed it, the fundamental differences with a Brouwerian account arise
at a common level.
Characteristic of all these accounts, including Brouwer’s, is that the no-
tion of a totality of all possible proofs is replaced by that of a potentially
infinite collection of proofs of different levels, and an operator is introduced
that reduces an arbitrary proof to one in that collection. One of the dif-
ferences between Kreisel’s original theory of constructions and Goodman’s
version is precisely that Kreisel entertained the thought of a reducibility
operator but did not use it (Kreisel, 1965, pp.126–127, 2.215). The reduced
proofs are such that they can be constructed ‘from below’, so that the expla-
nation what a reduced proof of A is will not be circular. The explanations
of implication then avoid the notion of an arbitrary proof of A, and in-
stead appeal to that of an arbitrary reduced one. What distinguishes these
37For a recent discussion of this theory (these theories), and further references, see
Dean & Kurokawa 2015.
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approaches from one another is their underlying notion of proof and the
aspect of proofs that is the basis for the reduction procedure.
In the Brouwerian case, the levels are the stages of the Creating Sub-
ject’s activity and, as on his conception proofs only exist in the sense of
demonstrations, the reducibility operator is the trivial one.
In Goodman’s modification of Kreisel’s theory of constructions, the
levels are identified with ‘maximal grasped domains’ (Goodman, 1970,
pp.109–110). Goodman does not elaborate much on what a ‘grasped do-
main’ is, but he does say that it is a domain of constructions that ‘has
been grasped as a totality’, that the sense of ‘grasp’ here is such that ‘we
cannot grasp the whole of the constructive universe, which is always only
a potential totality’, and that a ‘maximal’ grasped domain is one that ‘in-
clude[s] everything which is immediately understood when their elements
are understood’. For example, the natural numbers form, by themselves,
a grasped domain, but not a maximal one because implicit in the species
of natural numbers is that of constructive numerical functions (Goodman,
1970, p.110). There is a basic domain B, which is level 0 and includes the
natural numbers; and there is an operation E to extend a level so as to
obtain the next:
Given any level L, we suppose that we can extend L to a new
level containing all the objects of L, all proofs about objects
of L, and certain additional constructions [. . . ] We emphasize
that this is not a stratification by logical type, but rather a
stratification according to the subject matter of proofs.
Clearly, what does and does not belong to a maximal grasped domain is, in
its dependence on what is ‘immediately understood when the elements are
understood’, vague, and prone to grow over time, as with further experience
we may come to find more to be ‘immediately understood’.
The extension operation E suffers from similar problems. Goodman is
aware of this: In the companion paper Goodman 1973a, ‘The arithmetic
theory of constructions’, he writes that
the rule which leads from the nth level to the n+1st is not a rule
which we can understand. If it were, then we could understand
the notion of proof in an absolute sense and could visualize
the entire constructive universe. But that leads at once to self-
reflexive paradoxes.
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(I will return to the role of visualisation below.)
In spite of this vagueness, an operator F is introduced:
Suppose we have a grasped domain38 a. Then we wish a to be
as self-contained as possible. Therefore, if we have any rule z,
then we suppose that we can find a rule Faz in the domain a
with the property that, if x is in a and zx is defined and in a,
then
⊢ Fazx ≡ zx.
It is crucial to the conception of levels as built from below, Goodman points
out, that Fa applied to z yields a rule already present in a that represents
z in a extensionally; z may itself have been defined at a much higher level,
but the definition of Faz should not depend on that of z (Goodman, 1970,
p.110).
Now the key claim is this:
The introduction of the reducibility operator F is made neces-
sary by the impredicative character of intuitionistic implication.
It seems to us essential to the intuitionistic position that given
a fixed assertion A about a well-defined domain, there is always
an a priori upper bound to the complexity of possible proofs of
A. In case A is an implication, this principle already guarantees
the existence of some sort of reducibility operator. (Goodman,
1970, p.111)
Specifically, Goodman assumes that if a statement involves quantification
over a domain of level at most p, then if there is a proof of that statement
at all, there is one of level p + 1. Under that assumption, implication can
be defined in a way that is not impredicative. As mentioned, such a re-
ducibility hypothesis had been stated by Kreisel, but not used (his theory
of constructions is not stratified). The hypothesis is a very strong one. Being
an existence claim, it requires that such a proof at level p+1 be obtainable
from an arbitrary proof of A by a constructive method.
However, in ‘The arithmetic theory of constructions’, Goodman states
38[By this point, Goodman has adopted the convention that the grasped domains will
always be understood to be maximal (Goodman, 1970, p.110).]
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his conviction that ‘All of constructive mathematics is ultimately based
on finitary computation and on reasoning about finitary computation’
(Goodman, 1973a, p.284). From what he goes on to say, it is clear that
for Goodman ‘reasoning about finitary computation’ proceeds by visualisa-
tion:
These insights can always be put into the following form: a par-
ticular rule a, applied to any element of this basic universe, al-
ways gives the value
∼
T . Such an insight is evidently in ∀∃ form.
It asserts that a certain rule is actually a function – specifi-
cally, the constant function whose value is always
∼
T . We can
think of the insight as the visualization, or grasping, of the to-
tality of the computations of the values of the function. The
formal proof, which is a finite object, is not the insight but only
a guide to aid us in the visualization of this infinite structure
of computations. [. . . ] Thus we can repeat the entire construc-
tion above and consider insights which involve visualizing the
whole of level one. These insights will be of level two. (Goodman,
1973a, pp.284,286)
Given this conviction about what constructive mathematics consists in, the
existence of the required reducibility operator may be easier to argue for,
and Goodman makes an attempt in that direction:
Let us suppose we have a rule a which is not of level 0. Sup-
pose we apply a to an object b of level 0 and obtain a result, ab,
which is again of level 0. Then it might happen that the compu-
tation of the value ab involves the visualization of the whole of
level zero or of some even more complicated totality. It seems to
us, however, that that visualization cannot actually be essential
to the computation. For, the visualization of such a totality of
computations cannot make it possible for us to make any com-
putation other than the ones being visualized. Moreover, since
the result of the computation does not involve any infinite in-
sight, the computation of ab can only be using, so to speak, a
bounded part of the infinite visualization. In other words, we are
asserting that if an infinite visualization is essential to a compu-
tation, then it must occur in the result of the computation. We
may imagine, for example, that the computations are given in a
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normal form in which the act of visualization plays the role of
an ω-rule. Then, following Brouwer’s proof of the bar theorem,
we are saying that any operation which plays the role of a cut-
rule can be eliminated, so that only visualizations which occur
in the result are necessary for the computation.
It follows from this line of reasoning that if we are given a
rule a which is not of level zero, then we can think of it as a rule
c of level zero by simply ignoring any request for a visualization
which cannot be carried out at level zero. (Goodman, 1973a,
pp.285–286)
Further clarification would be needed to explain what, if ‘the visualization
of a totality of computations cannot make it possible for us to make any
computation other than the ones being visualized’, and if computation is all
we are interested in, would motivate introducing such a visualisation into
the construction of a rule a in the first place. Be that as it may, I take it
that this, or something like it, is what Goodman had in mind in the paper
of 1970; it would be hard to see in what other way he could have hoped to
justify the claim he makes.
As an understanding of constructive reasoning about proofs, this limita-
tion to finitary reasoning is overly restrictive, as Kreisel justly complained
in his review for Zentralblatt (Kreisel, 1974).39 A more charitable reading
of the 1970 paper than Goodman allows himself in his elucidation of 1973,
however, is vulnerable to the point made by Weinstein that
The fact that various higher order intuitionistic systems are con-
servative extensions of Heyting arithmetic with respect to uni-
versal decidable sentences is rather weak evidence for such a
claim [of the existence of the reducibility operator], since it may
just indicate our current inability to successfully exploit the in-
tuitionistic notions. (Weinstein, 1983, p.266)40
In conclusion of this discussion of Goodman’s theory, its notion of level
(maximal grasped domain) is much less clear than in the Brouwerian ac-
39Kreisel will have thought of the introduction to Gödel 1958.
40Since these conservativity results had not been invoked by Goodman, it seems that
they were the most plausible consideration that Weinstein could think of in favour of
Goodman’s claim (his list of references includes neither Goodman 1973a nor Kreisel
1974.)
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count (demonstrations effected up to a given stage of the Creating Subject’s
activity), and the required reducibility operator is highly problematic.
The other constructive account of implication to consider is based on the
notion of ‘canonical proof’, introduced by Dummett in his talk at the Bris-
tol Logic Colloquium in 1973 and published as ‘The philosophical basis of
intuitionistic logic’ (Dummett, 1975). (Brouwer also had a notion of canon-
ical proof, but that is significantly different, as will be discussed below.) A
canonical proof is one in which the last step towards the conclusion is the
introduction of the main connective in the conclusion. The key observation
is that an inference such as
(A→ B)→ A A→ B
→-E
A
and indeed modus ponens generally, is not canonical. Impredicativity of the
clause of the Proof Interpretation for implication then would be avoided by
explaining a proposition A→ B not in terms of any proof of the antecedent,
but in terms of proofs that are canonical (Dummett, 1977, p.394ff). Sund-
holm (1994, p.149) has remarked that that requirement would be unneces-
sarily strong: Implication may be defined for propositions whose proofs can
be reduced to canonical form. The function f that proves A → B would
then begin by performing that reduction. Of course also this latter way of
going about it depends for its success on the existence of a proof that is
wholly canonical.
The reduction procedure would fulfill the role of the reduction operator
in the general scheme of stratification outlined above; the stratification
would have only one level, that of the canonical proofs. The status of the
reducibility thesis that every proof is equivalent to one in canonical form
depends entirely on one’s exact notion of proof. In Martin-Löf’s type theory,
proofs are reducible to canonical form by definition: in that theory, that an
object a is a proof of proposition A means that a is ultimately reducible
to a proof in which all steps are canonical. The reduction of the former to
the latter is a mechanical procedure based on the syntax of the language.
Any object that does not allow for such canonisation is for that reason not
a proof. For those not accepting that approach, the reducibility thesis is
a very substantive one. Dummett, who never discussed Martin-Löf’s work
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in detail,41 let alone adopt particular ideas of it,42 never quite managed
to find a justifiable alternative construal. That the attempt, in the first
edition of Elements of Intuitionism, to identify canonical proofs with normal
derivations in a formal system was problematic was acknowledged there
by Dummett himself (1977, pp.400–403),43 and likewise he considered the
reworked conception in The Logical Basis of Metaphysics of 1991 ‘very
shaky’ already then (1991b, p.277).44 In the second edition of Elements of
Intuitionism (2000), Dummett instead chose to argue that impredicativity
of implication is harmless. The particular case he discusses is that of (B →
C) → D. The ability to understand proofs of the antecedent would seem
to require an ability to survey of all possible proofs of it, because there
is no a priori limit to the complexity of an operation transforming proofs
of B into a proof of C. This would threaten compositionality of meaning,
as understanding (B → C) → D then presupposes an understanding of
propositions that are of the same or greater complexity than its own. But,
Dummett argues, this is not so; all that is really required to understand
the antecedent is the ability to recognise of an operation that it is effective
and that it will transform any proof of B into a proof of C. ‘We need not
survey or circumscribe possible such operations in any more particular way
than this’ (Dummett, 2000, p.274).
Be that as it may, there are very general reasons why to a Brouwerian
the meaning-theoretical approach to logic exemplified in the work of Dum-
mett, Prawitz, and Martin-Löf,45 is not attractive; and the differences are
of mathematical significance, as seen in the example of the Bar Theorem, of
which there is a demonstration on a Brouwerian construal of that term but
41Sundholm informed me that part of the motivation behind his ‘Vestiges of realism’
(1994) was to encourage Dummett to do so; alas, Dummett in his published reply did
not seize this opportunity.
42I will leave it to others to determine how easy or difficult this might be, given Dum-
mett’s other theoretical commitments. See, for a start, Sundholm 1994 and Dummett’s
reply, Dummett 1994.
43See also Prawitz 1987, section 8, and Weiss 1997.
44On this point also Prawitz 1994, p.375 and Sundholm 1998, pp.205–209.
45It should be noted that of these three, it is in various ways Martin-Löf’s approach
that comes closest to Brouwer’s; I have in mind here in particular the role of the dif-
ference between proof objects and demonstrations, the importance accorded to acts
more generally, and its functional character; see also footnote 50. But I share Veld-
man’s reservations having to do with the homogeneity of the notion of type and with the
largely linguistic character of the theory (Veldman, 1984, pp.312–313); I would say these
are typical for an ontological descriptivist faced with meaning-theoretical foundations
(Sundholm & van Atten, 2008, section 5).
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not a meaning-theoretical one.46 These general reasons have been discussed
in Sundholm & van Atten 2008. We there characterised Brouwer’s views as
‘ontological descriptivist’ as opposed to meaning-theoretical; an ontological
descriptivist is someone for whom ‘the correctness of a knowledge claim is
[. . . ] ultimately reduced to matters of ontology’ (Sundholm & van Atten,
2008, p.71), and meaning theory plays no ultimate role. Here I should like
to make, in that light, some remarks on Brouwer’s notion of canonicity and
its differences from the meaning-theoretical notion of canonicity.
Canonicity as appealed to by Brouwer in ‘Definitionsbereiche’ (1927b,
p.64), is not that of a small set of general steps into which any proof can
be analysed. His notion is general with respect to structure only in the
sense that for him mathematical demonstrations are species that are well-
ordered;47 but they are not general with respect to what the canonical steps
are. They may vary from case to case, as is clear from the example of the
the three canonical steps that figure in Brouwer’s analysis of demonstrations
that a tree is barred. The only criterion for canonical steps is that they be
‘immediately given to intuition’ (Brouwer, 1927b, p.64n8)48. Such intuitive
givenness will depend on the structure of the specific objects involved in the
demonstration,49 and on the specific property to be established. Here lies
also the reason why Brouwer’s thesis that if there is a demonstration that
a tree is barred, then there is one in the canonical form he specifies, does
not presuppose a grasp of all possible means to establish the presence of a
bar, which is an open-ended collection. The three canonical steps Brouwer
specifies are obtained not from such a grasp, but derived directly from
properties of the objects involved: Any other way to show that all choice
sequences passing through a given node in the tree meet the bar would
imply the presence of restrictions on those sequences that are not stated in
46Constructivists of other stripes often accept the principle of bar induction as prim-
itive, an alternative that Brouwer had indicated in Brouwer 1927b, p.63n7. As a cu-
riosity, I mention that Gödel once suggested that a normal form for all mathematical
proofs might be found, and expressed the hope of proving the Bar Theorem from that
(van Atten, 2015b, p.223).
47More precisely, they are ‘pseudo-well-ordered’: a well-ordered structure of which the
elements are subsequently marked ‘empty’ or ‘full’, depending on whether they play a
role in the demonstration or not (Brouwer 1927b, p.64n8 and Brouwer 1981, pp.46–47).
48‘der Intuition unmittelbar gegeben’
49One may wish to generalise, with Husserl, the notion of syntax, and distinguish
between the syntax of linguistic expressions and the syntax of categorially formed objects:
Husserl 1974, section 42b–d and Beilage I; Husserl 1976, section 11; Husserl 985b, p.247n.
31
the hypothesis of the Bar Theorem. (This suggestion will be worked out in
a later note.)
Brouwer’s notion of canonicity then is in particular not constrained by
linguistic forms, of which logical form would be an example.50 This view is
expressed already in Brouwer’s dissertation:
While thus mathematics is independent of logic, logic does de-
pend upon mathematics; in the first place intuitive logical rea-
soning is that special kind of mathematical reasoning which re-
mains if, considering mathematical structures, one restricts one-
self to relations of whole and part; the mathematical structures
themselves are in no respect especially elementary, so they do
not justify any priority of logical reasoning over ordinary math-
ematical reasoning. (Brouwer 1907, p.127, trl. Brouwer 1975,
p.73)
And even though Brouwer did not at that point have his notion of canonical
demonstration yet, he was already at that stage prepared to allow that
the structure of a mental demonstration and the structure of a linguistic
representation of it do not coincide:
Even in domains of mathematics where no relations of whole
and part enter, the relations which were in the mind are often
transformed into relations of whole and part, when they must
be communicated verbally to other people; hereby the usual lan-
guage of mathematics is imbued with that of logical reasoning.
However, this fact is due only to the centuries-old tradition of
logical terms in language, in connection with its limited vocab-
50As Kreisel pointed out, for Brouwer the (introduction and elimination) rules for
the logical connectives would not define them, but describe (languageless) mathematical
operations for which they have been recognised to be valid (Kreisel, 1965, p.122, 2.121).
In this particular respect, functional interpretations of intuitionistic logic come closer to
what intuitionists mean than meaning-theoretical accounts depending on cut elimination
(such as Dummett’s and Prawitz’, but not Martin-Löf’s): From the intuitionistic point of
view, the former track the original languageless process of construction, whereas the latter
yield a linguistic object that is no longer a direct representation of that process. (This
footnote was inspired by Kreisel & MacIntyre 1982, p.231. I thank Göran Sundholm for
his emphasis, in discussion of this footnote, that Martin-Löf’s Constructive Type Theory
is a functional interpretation.)
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ulary. (Brouwer 1907, p.128n, emphasis Brouwer’s, trl. Brouwer
1975, p.73)
By the time of the Bar Theorem, Brouwer exploits another structural dif-
ference: demonstrations, conceived of as mental objects, are in general po-
tentially infinite, whereas expressions in the languages we actually use are
finite. This contrast is brought up by Brouwer as his main argument, in
1927, against Hilbert’s formalism (quoted on p. 14 above); it likewise serves
to draw a contrast to the meaning-theoretical tradition.
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